There is a close connection between EU citizenship and rights, both in the law and literature. This article claims that EU lawyers' understanding of EU citizenship and rights suffers from empirical, normative, and conceptual shortcomings. I will point out that there has been insufficient awareness for the boundedness of EU citizenship, the political structure of the EU and the constraints this (realistically) imposes on the 'meaningfulness' of EU citizenship. EU citizenship must not be understood as requiring an elaborate set of equal rights for all Union citizens throuzghout the EU, but valued for its ability to allow its status holders to enjoy (almost) full membership in the Member States of which they do not possess nationality.
Rather than providing for an elaborate set of equal rights for all Union citizens throughout the EU, the true strength of EU citizenship emanates from its ability to allow its status holders to enjoy (almost) full membership in the Member States of which they do not possess nationality. To explore these issues, I will zoom in onto one particular aspect of the debate on EU citizenship and rights, namely the interaction between EU citizenship and fundamental rights. 5 For heuristic purposes, I will focus on the empirical, normative, and conceptual assumptions underlying the by now famous Heidelberg proposal for the protection of fundamental rights through EU citizenship. 6 I will argue that we would be mistaken, empirically, normatively, and conceptually, to intertwine citizenship and fundamental rights. Through that discussion, I will draw attention to broader conceptual and normative shortcomings in dominant approaches to EU citizenship, on its relationship with rights, its position within the EU's political framework, and the position of those not enjoying EU citizenship status. I will point out that there has been insufficient awareness of the boundedness of EU citizenship, the political structure of the EU and the constraints this (realistically) imposes on the 'meaningfulness' of EU citizenship. EU citizenship must not be understood as requiring an elaborate set of equal rights for all Union citizens throughout the EU, but valued for its ability to allow its status holders to enjoy (almost) full membership in the Member States of which they do not possess nationality.
Having provided an outline of the core arguments in favour of a stronger connection between EU citizenship and fundamental rights (section 2), I will go on to demonstrate the empirical, normative, and conceptual weaknesses of these proposals. Section 3 discusses the empirical side and explains that debate has overlooked the disentanglement between citizenship and rights that has occurred in recent decades. Section 4 argues that this disentanglement is also normatively desirable over providing only those in the possession of the status of citizenship with a set of basic rights; fundamental rights' presumption of universality is diametrically opposed to the bounded and exclusionary nature of citizenship. The project of linking fundamental rights and EU citizenship may be motivated by the intention to overcome existing divisions within the EU, but it presupposes a new fault line based on the boundaries of nationality, which likely comes at the expense of third-country nationals. Section 5 challenges on conceptual grounds the idea that for EU citizenship to have sufficient substance, an allencompassing set of European-wide fundamental rights is needed. Adherents of this idea tend to misconceptualise the concept and misunderstand EU citizenship's normative import, resulting in a questionable push for homogenisation and harmonisation.
| FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF EU CITIZENSHIP
The Treaty of Maastricht introduced a common European Union citizenship for all nationals of EU Member States. To many, that new common citizenship did not live up to its potential and it was dismissed as a meaningless addition to the Treaties, a symbolic gesture at most: a 'pie in the sky' 7 and 'a cynical exercise in public relations'. 8 That is because those who looked for something substantially new in the Treaties were searching in vain. 9 The Treaties reiterated traditional free movement and non-discrimination rights. EU citizens enjoy the right to move freely around the European Union and take up residence in Member States of which they do not possess nationality. 21 That chapter is Title V of the Charter, which is more or less a copy of the rights of EU citizenship we find in the Treaties.
Other than the provisions in Title V laying down the citizens' rights, only two articles explicitly mention EU citizenship. The first is Article 12 of the Charter, stating that '[p]olitical parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union'. The second is Article 15, which reads as follows: 'Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State'. That the Treaty provides rights of democratic participation to EU citizens only and also allows for distinctions between EU citizens and third-country nationals with respect to economic free movement rights explains the invocation of EU citizenship in those Charter provisions. and the less well-off. 25 Occasionally, the Court even hinted at there being a strong link between EU citizenship and fundamental rights, stating that national legislation should comply 'with the requirements of EU law concerning the effective protection of the fundamental rights conferred on EU citizens'.
26
This idea, which has entertained scholars since the 1990s, gained more traction in recent years, particularly following the Court's decision in Ruiz Zambrano. In her elaborate Opinion, Advocate General Sharpston called for a reconsideration of the bonds between the EU citizen and the EU. That had to come about through a more expansive protection of fundamental rights for EU citizens. 27 The ECJ followed up by deciding that Member States could no longer deprive Union citizens of the 'genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union'. 28 What it meant by that, and what the precise scope of the substance of the rights of EU citizens was, it failed to elucidate at the time, but the expectation that it had to have implications for the division of competences within the EU concerning the protection of fundamental rights was justified. 29 Belgium was precluded from expelling EU citizens from their territory and, 30 of course, had the Court's intention been the protection of one of the rights of EU citizens already enshrined in the Treaties, one would have expected the decision to have clarified this. 31 Scholars keen to add further substance to EU citizenship were keen to stress, therefore, that 'the Charter should eventually become a significant part of the said "substance of the rights attached to the status of citizenship"'.
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Many members of the legal academic community have sided with the idea that fundamental rights constitute the core of EU citizenship. 33 The most famous elaboration of the potential of Ruiz Zambrano for the protection of fundamental rights within the EU has been the Heidelberg proposal, instigated by Von Bogdandy. Accordingly, Ruiz
Zambrano should be interpreted as a reversal of the Solange case law of the German Constitutional Court. 34 The idea is that 'Member States remain autonomous in fundamental rights protection as long as it can be presumed that they ensure the essence of fundamental rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU' . 35 The rationale of this proposal is inspired, not just by the Court's decisions, but by the deeper conceptual meaning of citizenship as understood by the Heidelberg group. They put forward three reasons for constructing a closer relationship between EU citizenship and fundamental rights.
Firstly, it is in line with the historical emergence of fundamental rights as citizens' rights in European
States. Secondly, with regard to EU law, there is an even more pronounced historical and teleological connection: both discourses developed around the same period in reaction to the pressing legitimacy question. Citizenship and fundamental rights are therefore two mutually strengthening concepts which essentially pursue the same objective, i.e. to bring the Union closer to the individual (…) Finally, if Union citizenship is to be taken seriously, it cannot be completely separated from fundamental rights questions.
36
The strength of this proposal has been oft-discussed, but, interestingly, these discussions leave largely unquestioned the citizenship rationale that forms the normative and conceptual foundation for their thesis. While some dubbed the proposal to be too intrusive and unfit for the current state of EU integration, 37 others dismissed it for its too limited scope. 38 Hardly anyone has considered the Heidelberg group's interpretation of the meaning and place of citizenship within the EU.
In what follows, I will discuss the empirical, normative, and conceptual aspects of the Heidelberg proposal and
show that linking EU citizenship and (fundamental) rights is more problematic than commonly thought. The Heidelberg group's understanding of EU citizenship is far from unique, however; others who seek to premise fundamental rights on EU citizenship share their assumptions at least in part. Based on a discussion of the assumptions supporting the Heidelberg group's proposal, I will draw attention to the empirical, normative, and conceptual problems of the wider academic discussion on EU citizenship. The analysis that follows, therefore, allows for broader conceptual and normative reflection on EU citizenship and rights, the position within the EU's political framework and the questions of legitimacy that are raised thereby, and the status of those individuals not enjoying EU citizenship status. It allows for a reconsideration of the idea that providing some degree of equality of rights throughout the EU is essential for the meaningfulness of EU citizenship. I will argue that the Heidelberg group's argument that a historical connection exists between fundamental rights and citizenship rights is empirically questionable (section 3); the notion that fundamental rights and citizenship serve the same legitimising function, by bringing the EU closer to the individual, is normatively problematic (section 4); the thesis that Union citizenship cannot be taken seriously without adequate fundamental rights protection by the EU is conceptually problematic (section 5).
| EU CITIZENSHIP AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS-EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS
The literature assumes the existence of an intimate historical connection between citizenship and (fundamental)
rights. That assumption is easily understood. Both ideas share a common origin in Enlightenment principles and and increasingly countries have started to include this group in their franchise.
The aspirations of those international documents have seen translation and application into our day-to-day practices. In fact, the practice of extending rights to non-citizens predates the international human rights regime. the laundry business that were of Chinese descent. The US Supreme Court decided this law to be unconstitutional and to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, 52 which is 'universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction' .
53
Also within Europe we have witnessed a trend towards a decoupling of rights from the status of citizenship.
Under the pressure of international human rights regimes and increased labour migration, it was residence, not citizenship, that came to define who was provided civil, social, and at times political rights within Europe. 54 To some, this signifies the development towards forms of 'postnational membership' , to use Soysal's famous description, 55 meaning the move away from citizenship to personhood as the signifier of who deserves protection. This development has been so pervasive that 'in many respects, the status of aliens in liberal democratic societies is hardly distinguishable from that of citizens'.
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Evidently, this development has not been linear and uniform. National citizenship still matters and not all noncitizens have been able to benefit from the extension of the scope of fundamental rights-the current refugee crisis within the EU once more demonstrates the acuteness of this situation. A more accurate description of the current status quo might be one that draws the boundary between residents and non-residents, 57 though even that does not fully cover the complexity of the current legal regimes within Europe and beyond. 58 What is beyond dispute though is that citizenship has become a less relevant factor during the last decades with respect to the acquisition of rights.
This is a development that extends beyond the nation-state and also the EU has felt morally obliged to include those not holding the status of EU citizenship and to developed a separate legal framework for the different classes of non-citizens. According to the conclusions of the Tampere European Council, The EU has adopted a whole range of legislative measures that re-defined the position of third-country nationals and residents. 60 Those policies have unravelled the relationship between EU citizenship and many of the rights enjoyed by them, thereby providing large groups of third-country nationals within the EU with quasi-citizenship rights. 61 This section once more confirms that '[t] he idea that citizenship is the special status that distinguishes insiders from outsiders is so deeply rooted in our traditions of thought and expression that it is hard sometimes to recognize how poorly this fits with our actual practices'. 62 While it is not completely incorrect to ascribe an important rightbearing status to citizenship, it is not the case, contrary to claim of the Heidelberg group, that fundamental rights have historically been defined as citizenship rights. Certainly, when we take into consideration the developments in the most recent decades, the Member States as well as the EU have expanded the scope of many (fundamental) rights so as to protect the basic rights of its (resident) non-citizens.
| EU CITIZENSHIP AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS-NORMATIVE PROBLEMS
To describe these historical developments is not the same as offering a normative defence. However, I argue in this section that the disentanglement of citizenship and rights that took place in recent decades is also normatively desirable and should not be undone by EU law. Citizenship is contingent on the accidents of birth. 63 The great majority of individuals enjoy citizenship either of their country of birth (ius soli) or of the country of citizenship of their parents (ius sanguinus). While there may be certain advantages of assigning citizenship to individuals by birth, citizenship should not for most practical purposes be decisive and condition individuals' legal entitlements. In our democratic societies, non-citizen residents enjoy many of the legal rights and duties of citizenship and there are good reasons for thinking that this is desirable.
All residents should be in the position from which they can challenge government decisions. Hence, it is not the status of citizenship that should determine who stands in a position of power vis-à-vis the state. Principles of fairness and justice, moreover, demand that those who participate and contribute to society can demand a fair return.
Residents pay taxes and participate in civil society in ways that are indistinguishable from citizens, which is why they should for most purposes receive the same treatment. Following that intuition, Walzer believed that people 'are against a state's coercive powers, most rights should not be premised on citizenship.
respect to fundamental rights, which should be granted to everyone present within a state's jurisdiction. 69 That is, as Benhabib has put it, '[t] he status of alienage ought not to denude one of fundamental rights.' 70 At first sight, EU citizenship may seem like a status to which to attach an elaborate set of rights. EU citizenship has been characterised as a form of postnational citizenship, 71 which is defined as membership on the basis of 'personhood'. 72 Would this assessment be correct, linking fundamental rights to EU citizenship might not run into the normative difficulties outlined above. The Treaties, however, tell us that EU citizenship is a form of citizenship beyond the state, but not postnational in the sense meant by Soysal. Only those holding the nationality of a Member
State are citizens of the Union. 73 EU citizenship thus is a bounded concept, 'defined so as to exclude' . 74 By only allowing those bearing the status of EU citizenship to vindicate their fundamental rights, only those in the possession of a Member State nationality could claim protection under EU law. That would create an arbitrary distinction with respect to who enjoys protection. Denigrating non-citizens to a second-class position with respect to basic rights is something to be condemned rather than promoted.
Premising fundamental rights on citizenship also opposes the values the EU stands for. If it is indeed the case that the ethos of European integration is about the inclusion rather than the exclusion of the other, and about integration rather than segregation, 75 fundamental rights should not be conflated with citizenship rights. Contrary to common perceptions, 76 moreover, the EU citizenship-fundamental rights connection would not reinforce the liberal democratic values the EU proclaims as foundational, but undermine those. The EU would not serve as the 'tamer' of the nation-state and of nationalism, 77 but reinforce the nationality of the Member States through EU citizenship. It would be a mistake to strengthen the nationalities of the Member States through EU citizenship at the expense of those not being a Member State national. To agree with Carens, 'we do not enhance the meaning of citizenship in any positive sense when we make citizenship the basis for a form of discrimination against people who are otherwise entitled to be treated as equals'. Citizenship is no longer exclusively tied to the nation-state. 87 Nonetheless, the traditional understanding of citizenship as inextricably connected to the state still defines much of our thinking about this concept. As Carens aptly formulated:
talk about citizenship sometimes presupposes, as a background assumption, an idealized (and misleading) conception of the nation-state as an administratively centralized, culturally homogeneous form of political community in which citizenship is treated primarily as a legal status that is universal, equal, and democratic. 88 While citizenship conceptualisations are rarely, if ever, this extreme, it certainly is the case that a 'state-centric, unitary vision of [citizenship]' 89 implicitly drives the debate on EU citizenship.
Not surprisingly, such a vision on citizenship results in a push for more homogenisation and harmonisation. If the aspiration is to elevate EU citizenship above free movement, national conceptions of justice, rights, and the good must be replaced with a common (and, most likely, Court-imposed) European one. Equal citizenship is understood as equal citizenship rights for all throughout the entire polity, which expresses a clear preference for uniformity and supranationality over diversity and local democratic self-government. Not only is this a faint and far-away 'ideal' , but it simply cannot be squared with the EU's current political and social structures, its division of powers and the democratic legitimacy offered by national representative processes of decision-making. One can submit that the EU as a polity must be shaped with the purpose of making it compatible with our or the ECJ's best understanding of EU citizenship, 90 but that would turn things on its head. Rather, to agree with Carens, 'our conceptions of citizenship and political community should grow out of, rather than determine, the political and social arrangements that we choose'. 91 First, a determination must be made of the arrangements that are desirable and legitimate within the EU, before we search for an understanding of EU citizenship that is compatible with it.
An alternative conceptualisation of EU citizenship that is possible to embed within existing arrangements is possible. A comparative perspective allows us to comprehend why EU citizenship is neither unique nor meaningless. 92 Conceptually speaking, EU citizenship possesses the key characteristics of what is called the federal citizenship family, the most particular feature of which is that it is a form of dual citizenship. Federal citizens possess 'membership in two political communities within the same state'. 93 A federal citizen is a member of the federation as a whole as well as of one of the federation's constituent states. 94 Also EU citizens, according to Article 20 TFEU, As a result, EU citizenship, like other forms of federal citizenship, is characterised by a horizontal and a vertical dimension. The vertical dimension signifies the direct link between the EU citizen and EU institutions, mainly through the right to vote for the European Parliament. The horizontal dimension allows the Union citizen to move throughout the territory of the Union and to be treated equally to the citizens residing there. 95 The rights belonging to this horizontal dimension-the right to free movement and the right to equal treatment
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-also are the core rights of citizens in other federal states. 97 EU citizenship may indeed look rather meagre when considering solely its vertical dimension, but it is the horizontal dimension which provides it with real substance; EU citizenship allows its status holders to enjoy, albeit with some (far from irrelevant) exceptions, full membership in Member States of which they are not nationals. 98 The right to free movement provides Union citizens with the option to 'vote with their feet', 99 thereby enabling them to pursue their conception of 'the good life' . 100 Federal citizenship does not depart from the ideal of equal citizenship, but merely takes into account the federal structure when determining to whom to extend equal treatment. Inevitably, there is a tension between equal citizenship and federalism. The division of powers in federations necessarily implies that not all citizens are granted uniform rights. Full equal citizenship and federalism are two conflicting ideals: 'More equality between citizens across the federation almost necessarily implies less freedom … for the component units' . 101 Federal citizenship, instead, guarantees that in the case powers are retained by the constituting states, equality of treatment is guaranteedalthough exceptions may be tolerated-within the boundaries of those states with respect to all citizens resident there. The right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality guarantees virtually the same within the EU. 102 That equal citizenship should require a uniformly applied bill of rights, or at least a set of minimum rights, is, therefore, debatable.
That this is a conceptual possibility does not explain its normative desirability. 103 I have explained that the dominant understanding of Union citizenship sits uncomfortably with the EU's political structures and the previous section explained the normative dilemmas of connecting EU citizenship and fundamental rights, but I should also explain the desirability of the federal over the uniform conception (beyond the complete mismatch between the latter and the EU's political setup).
The understanding of EU citizenship defended here recognises the EU's value plurality and that disagreements on justice and rights are for reasons of political legitimacy ideally decided through democratic procedures. 104 The use of the provisions on EU citizenship as a centralising device undermines the EU's value diversity and puts pressure on the national demoi's ability to decide these matters democratically. 105 Of course, none of the scholars who aspire to strengthen the connection between EU citizenship and fundamental rights tries to do away with diversity altogether. The Heidelberg group explicitly recognises the need to protect pluralism and, therefore, places limits upon the scope of their proposal. 106 Problematically, however, we often 'acknowledge "the fact of pluralism" yet seek to circumvent it'. 107 This inclination to preach diversity but to practice the opposite has a long history in European legal scholarship. As noted by Walker, 'what we observe in the history of the European Union is a jurisprudential "ratchet effect"-an equalization upwards of rights' . 108 It also informs many of the debates on EU citizenship, including the one on the relation between EU citizenship and fundamental rights. The direction taken by scholarship that is based on the idea that EU citizenship can be taken seriously only if a more substantive and elaborate set of rights is directly provided by the EU to its citizens, independent of the Member States, is unidimensional: it favours centralisation over diversity.
If there is concern for diversity at all, the idea of allowing for diversity and disagreement in the realm of fundamental rights finds less support. That view holds that there must be respect for the plurality of values within the EU, as long as fundamental rights are respected. 109 What such an argument ignores is that the definition and delineation of fundamental rights 'reflect fundamental societal choices and form an important part in the different identities of polities and societies'. 110 Rather than exempting fundamental rights from the area of politics, making it the exclusive realm of courts, we should acknowledge the inevitability of disagreement and contestation with respect to fundamental rights, about their scope and their bearing on concrete policy matters. 111 For that reason, we should shy away from overly using the language of equality and pushing for uniform policy outcomes throughout the EU, and focus more, instead, on how we can better mediate between different visions on rights and the good, and how to manage moral conflicts.
Of course, against the background of the democratic backsliding in some EU Member States and the onslaught on those values the EU proclaims to be foundational, which is the Heidelberg group's main concern, 112 That is certainly correct, but the argument here does not defend diversity and pluralism as intrinsically valuable, but holds that it is precisely because of questions of legitimacy, which arise so clearly once we bear in mind our reasonable disagreements on the common good, that the federal understanding of EU citizenship is desirable. This ties in with more political conceptions of citizenship defended by demoicratic accounts of the European Union.
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Deference to the substantive content of the Member States is desirable not because a plurality of substantive results is desirable, but because these are the product of national democratic processes of decision-making and legitimate, therefore, for content-independent reasons. 115 Diversity and pluralism cannot be juxtaposed so easily with democracy.
EU citizenship, and most of all the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, thus can fulfil an important democratic function, in the sense that it provides limits to the extent the EU can intrude in the democratically legitimated political decisions by the Member States. As accurately noted by Menéndez,
[a]s long as free movement of persons was considered as an operationalisation of the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality, the constitutional standards being applied were still national ones, an outcome in full accordance with the key legal role played by the collective of national constitutions as the deep constitution of the European Union, and consequently as the key source of democratic legitimacy of the synthetic constitutional order.
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Not only does the right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality provide the Union citizen with the capacity to settle elsewhere and to pursue their desired life there, it also respects the democratic outcomes within the Member
States. There is reason, therefore, to be suspicious about deviations from this right and to advance an understanding of EU citizenship that requires full equality of treatment throughout the EU.
Does this require the EU to be silent on the democratic backsliding taking place within certain Member States? I do not think so. All Member States signed up to certain basic values when they signed up to the Treaties and an EU response is legitimate, needed even, when Member States are sacrificing these. The EU wants its Member States to remain democratic, if only because its legitimacy is contingent thereupon. We should not think, however, that the democratic shortcomings in certain Member States are remediable by establishing a connection between EU citizenship and fundamental rights. For that, existing problems are far too profound and too deeply engrained within those states. Political pressure and measures rather than judicial solutions are needed in such circumstances. 117 It is only when the EU and the Member States are willing to undertake concerted action against the individual state that fails to uphold the adequate standards that the situation may change. This is clearly a topic that deserves more attention that I can give it here, and so is another, which I will only flag here. My emphasis on legitimate decision-making against the background of disagreement raises the question under which conditions the EU exercises authority legitimately. I believe that this requires deeper consideration of the value of legislative as opposed to judicial decision-making within the EU. 118 That topic also cannot be considered here in more detail unfortunately. 114 Nicolaïdis, above, n. 105; Bellamy, above, n. 105; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig, above, n. 105. 
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A useful starting point, it seems to me, is offered by the literature on demoicracy and their claim that EU decision-making must remain under the equal and shared control of the Member States. See the principles set out by Nicolaïdis, above, n. 105, at 362-365. See, also, Bellamy, above, n. 105.
| EU CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS: SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
This article addressed the idea of premising fundamental rights on EU citizenship. Through that discussion, it brought to light some common misunderstandings about (EU) citizenship. Even though rights remain an important component of citizenship, residents enjoy most of the legal rights (as well as duties) enjoyed by citizens. For most practical purposes, citizenship makes no difference. As I argued, following commonly accepted theories of membership, it would also be highly undesirable if citizenship were to condition access to most rights, certainly fundamental rights.
These observations put in question the common idea that fundamental rights have historically been premised on citizenship and that it would be normatively desirable if EU citizenship would condition access to fundamental rights.
While we commonly associate EU citizenship with inclusion, allowing Member State nationals to settle and claim rights in another Member State, we should not ignore the other, exclusionary, side of EU citizenship. Finally, I demonstrated that a state-centric and unitary vision of citizenship drives the debate on EU citizenship, according to which EU citizenship is to result in equal treatment of Union citizens throughout the EU. Not only is that understanding conceptually inadequate and ignores that EU citizenship has far more in common with the federal citizenship family than citizenship in unitary states, it also results in a push for homogenisation and harmonisation that risks undermining legitimate diversity and local self-determination within the EU.
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